

Curriculum Vitae

Professor Eberhard Feess

Employment History

Current Position

- March 2018- present Professor of Economics at Victoria University Wellington, New Zealand

Former academic positions

- 2008 –2018 Professor of Microeconomics at Frankfurt School of Finance and Management
- 2001 – 2008 Professor of Industrial at the Technical University of Aachen (RWTH)
- 1996 – 2001 Professor of Law & Economics at Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University in Frankfurt
- 1994 – 1996 Professor of Environmental Economics at European Business School in Oestrich-Winkel

Highest Education

- 1993 PhD in Economics (Goethe University Frankfurt)
- 1988 PhD in Sociology (Goethe University Frankfurt)

Research Focus

Law & Economics, Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Environmental Economics, Competition Policy

Publications

Articles in refereed Journals

1. Von Bieberstein, Frauke, **Feess, E.**, and Natalie Packham (2025): Multi-step delegation and the frequency of immoral decisions: Theory and experiment, *European Economic Review*, forthcoming.
2. **Feess, E.**, Steffen Lippert, and James Tremewan (2025): Leadership and cooperation in a sequential Prisoners' Dilemma, *European Economic Review*, forthcoming.
3. **Feess, E.**, Roe Sarel and Thomas Schilling: Moral Accounting and Real Effort: Experimental Evidence, *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, forthcoming.
4. **Feess, E.**, Loan Cong To Nguyen, and Ilan Noy (2024): Is investment in prevention correlated with insurance fraud? Theory and experiment, *Review of Law and Economics*.
5. Dato, S., **Feess, E.** and Nieken, P (2024). Lying in Competitive Environments: Identifying Behavioral Impacts, *European Economic Review*, Vol. 170 November.
6. **Feess, E.**, and Muehlheusser, G. (2024): Autonomous Vehicles: Moral dilemmas and adoption Incentives. *Transportation Research B*, Vol. 181.

7. **Feess, E.**, and Kerzenmacher, F. (2023): Sorting of trustees: The good and the bad stay in the game, *Economic Theory*, April 2023.
8. **Feess, E.**, Kerzenmacher, F., and Muehlheusser, G. (2023): Morally questionable decisions by groups: Guilt sharing and its underlying motives, *Games and Economic Behavior*, Vol. 140, July 2023, 380-400.
9. Dudek, T., **Feess, E.**, and Timofeyev, Y. (2023): Misreporting in teams with individual decision making: the impact of information and communication, *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, Vol. 209, May 2023, 509-532.
10. Becher, S., **Feess, E.** and Sarel, R. (2023): Regulating Product Return Policies: The Trade-off between Efficiency and Distribution, *The Journal of Legal Studies*, Vol. 52, January 2023, 137-191.
11. **Feess, E.**, Kerzenmacher, F. and Yuriy Timofeyev (2022): Utilitarian or deontological models of moral behavior -- what predicts moral transgressions?, *European Economic Review*, Vol. 149, October 2022, 104-125
12. **Feess, E.** and Sarel, R. (2022): Optimal fine reductions for self-reporting: The impact of loss aversion, *International Review of Law and Economics*, 2022, Vol. 70, June 2022, 106067.
13. **Feess, E.**, Feld, J. and S. Noy (2021). People judge discrimination against women more harshly than discrimination against men – does statistical fairness discrimination explain why?, *Frontiers in Psychology*, 2021; 12: 675776.
14. Bose, P., **Feess, E.** and H. Müller (2021): Favoritism towards high-status clubs: Evidence from German soccer, *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization*, August 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewab005>
15. Banner, C., **Feess, E.**, Packham, N. and M. Walzl (2021). Differentiation and Risk Aversion in Imperfectly Competitive Labor Markets, *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 212, pp. 273-310.
16. Buechel, B., **Feess, E.**, Muehlheusser, G. (2020). Optimal law enforcement with sophisticated and naïve offenders, *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 177 pp. 836-857.
17. **Feess, E.**, M.V. Levati, M. Rieser and I. Soraperra (2020). High-powered contracts, self-selection, and excessive risk taking in settings with externalities: Evidence from the laboratory, *Economica*, 87(346):328-363
18. **Feess, E.** and Yuriy Timofeyev (2020): Behavioral red flags and loss sizes from asset misappropriation: Evidence from the US', *Advances in Accounting Behavioral Research*, 23:77-117.
19. **Feess, E.**, C. Grund, M. Walzl and A. Wohlschlegel (2020). Competing Trade Mechanisms and Monotone Mechanism Choice, *European Journal of Operational Research*, 280(3):1108-1121
20. Dato, S., **Feess, E.** and Nieken, P (2019). Lying and Reciprocity, *Games and Economic Behavior*, 118, S. 193-218
21. Arin, K.P., **Feess, E.**, Kuhlenkasper, T. and Reich, O. (2019). Negotiating with Terrorists: The Costs of Compliance, *Southern Economic Journal*, 83, 305-317.
22. **Feess, E.** and R. Sarel: Judicial effort and the appeal system: Theory and experiment', *The Journal of Legal Studies* (2019), 47, 2.
23. **Feess, E.** and Florian Kerzenmacher: Lying opportunities and incentives to lie: Reference dependence versus reputation', *Games & Economic Behavior* (2018), Vol. 111, September, 274-288.
24. **Feess, E.**, Hannah Schildberg-Hoerisch, Markus Schramm and Ansgar Wohlschlegel: The impact of fine size and uncertainty on punishment and deterrence: Theory and evidence from the laboratory', *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 149 (2018), pp. 58-73.
25. **Feess, E.**, Helge Mueller and Ansgar Wohlschlegel): Reimbursement schemes for hospitals: The impact of case and firm characteristics' *Applied Economics*, (2018), <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00036846.2018.1528334>.
26. **Feess, E.** and Ansgar Wohlschlegel): Bank capital requirements and mandatory deferral of compensation' *Journal of Regulatory Economics* (2018), <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-018-9352-3>.

27. 'Moral hazard, risk sharing, and the optimal pool size' (with Frauke von Bieberstein, José F. Fernando, Florian Kerzenmacher and Jörg Schiller), *The Journal of Risk and Insurance* (2017), DOI: 10.1111/jori.1221.
28. 'Do capitation-based reimbursement systems underfund tertiary healthcare providers? Evidence from New Zealand (with Somi Shin, and Christoph Schumacher, *Health Economics* (2017), <https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.3478>.
29. 'Ability, team composition, and moral hazard: Evidence from the laboratory' (with D. Doll, and A. Mohnen), *Schmalenbach Business Review*, 18, 1 (2017), pp. 49-70.
30. 'Academic copyright in the publishing game: A contest perspective' (with M. Scheufen), *European Journal of Law and Economics*, 42, 2 (2016), pp. 263-294.
31. 'Estimating risk preferences of bettors with different bet sizes' (with H. Müller and C. Schumacher), *European Journal of Operational Research*, 249, 3 (2016), pp. 1102-1112.
32. 'Fixed fee licensing for cost-reducing technologies: Should innovators reveal their private information?' (with S. Gleave), *Review of Managerial Science*, 10, 4 (2016), pp. 781-799.
33. 'The impact of ability, rank and gender on risk-taking in contests: Evidence from the Ski World Cup' (with P. Jost, and H. Müller), *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 172, 4 (2016), pp. 573-614.
34. 'Contracts as rent-seeking devices: Evidence from German soccer' (with M. Gerfin and G. Mühlhaußer), *Economic Inquiry*, 53, 1 (2015), pp. 714-730.
35. 'Implementing efficient market structures: The role of information transmission' (with M. Paust), *FinanzArchiv*, 71, 2 (2015), pp. 240-277.
36. 'On the interplay of public and private law enforcement with multiple victims', *European Journal of Law and Economics*, 39, 1 (2015), pp. 79-95.
37. 'The determinants of environmental awareness: A multilevel analysis including value systems' (with S. Ruhnu), *Zeitschrift für Umweltpolitik und Umweltrecht*, Jg. 38, 2 (2015), pp. 147-184.
38. 'Surplus division and investment incentives in supply chains: A biform-game analysis' (with J. Thun), *European Journal of Operational Research*, 234, 3 (2014), pp. 763-773.
39. 'The German capital markets model case act (KapMuG): A European role model for increasing the efficiency of capital markets? Analysis and suggestions for reform' (with A. Halfmeier), *European Journal of Finance* 20, 4 (2014), pp. 361-379.
40. 'The favorite-longshot bias and the impact of experience' (with H. Müller, and C. Schumacher), *Business Research* 7, 2 (2014), pp. 217-234.
41. 'The impact of religion and the degree of religiosity on work ethic: A multilevel analysis' (with H. Müller, and S. Ruhnu), *Kyklos* 67, 4 (2014), pp. 506-534.
42. Bannier, C., Feess, E. and Packham, N.(2013). Competition, Bonuses, and Risk-Taking in the Banking Industry, *Review of Finance*, Vol. 17(2), pp. 653-690.
43. Feess, E. (2013). Negligence standards and care levels when damages depend on sales prices, *European Journal of Law and Economics*, Vol. 36(2), pp. 389-405.
44. Feess, E. and Schumacher, C. (2013). The Elasticity of Demand for Wagering in an Unregulated Market, *Applied Economics*, Vol. 45(15), pp. 2083-2091.
45. Feess, E. (2012). Malpractice liability, technology choice and negative defensive medicine, *European Journal of Health Economics*, Vol. 13(2), pp. 157-167.
46. Feess, E. and Hege, U. (2012). The Basel II Accord: Internal Ratings and Bank Differentiation, *Review of Finance*, Vol. 16(4), pp. 1043-1092.
47. Feess, E., Peren Arin, K. Chmelarova, V., and Ansgar Wohlschlegel, A. (2011). Why Are Corrupt Countries Less Successful in Consolidating Their Budgets?, *Journal of Public Economics*, Vol. 95(7/8), pp. 521-530.
48. Feess, E., Schieble, M. and Walzl, M. (2011). When it pays to conceal- on the optimal timing of acquiring verifiable information, *German Economic Review*, Vol. 12, pp. 100-123.
49. Feess, E. and Walzl, M. (2010). Evidence Dependence of Fine Reductions in Corporate Leniency Programs, *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, Vol. 166 (4), pp. 573-590.

50. Feess, E., Mühlheusser, G. and Wohlschlegel, A. (2011). Screening in courts: On the joint use of causation and negligence standards, *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization*, Vol. 27(2), pp. 350-75.
51. Feess, E. and Wohlschlegel, A. (2010). All-Unit Discounts and the Problem of Surplus Division, *Review of Industrial Organization*, Vol. 37(3), pp. 161-178.
52. Feess, E. (2010). Die gemeinsame Nutzung von Auflagen und Haftungsregeln bei ungeklärter Kausalität, *Zeitschrift für Umweltpolitik*.
53. Feess, E. and Wohlschlegel, A. (2009). Why higher punishment may reduce deterrence, *Economics Letters*, Vol. 104(2), pp. 69–71.
54. Feess, E. and Stähler, F. (2009). Revenue Sharing in Professional Sports Leagues, *Scottish Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 56(2), pp. 255-265.
55. Feess, E., Lorz, O. and Höck, M. (2009). International Technology Transfers and Competition, *Review of International Economics*, Vol. 17(5), pp. 1038- 1052.
56. Feess, E., Baum, I. and Wohlschlegel, A. (2009). Reporter's privilege and incentives to leak, *Review of Law and Economics*, Vol. 5(1), pp. 701-715.
57. Feess, E., Mühlheuser, G. and Wohlschlegel, A. (2009). Environmental Liability under Uncertain Causation, *European Journal of Law and Economics*, Vol. 28(2), pp. 133-148.
58. Feess, E., Altintig, A. and Arin, K.P. (2009). You are one of us now! How do share prices of rivals react to privatization, *Journal of Industrial Economics*, Vol. 57(2), pp. 265–293.
59. Feess, E., Mühlheuser, G. and Walzl, M. (2009). Auctions with handicaps, *Journal of Economics*.
60. Feess, E. and Ossig, S. (2007). Reimbursement schemes for hospitals, malpractice liability, and intrinsic motivation, *International Review of Law and Economics*, Vol. 27(4), pp. 423-441.
61. Feess, E. and Gleave, S. (2006). Patent Licensing and Price Discrimination, *Economic Bulletin*, Vol. 4(10), pp. 1-10.
62. Feess, E. and Wohlschlegel, A. (2006). Liability and Information Transmission, *Economics Letters*, Vol. 92, pp. 63-67.
63. Feess, E. and Schumacher, C. (2006). Why Costless Auditing May Reduce Social Welfare, *Economics Letters*, Vol. 90, pp. 407-411.
64. Heterogeneity and Optimal Self-Reporting (with M. Walzl), in: *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 162, 2, 2006, 277-290.
65. Feess, E. and Walzl, M. (2005). Optimal Self-Reporting Schemes with Multiple Stages and Option Values, *International Tax and Public Finance*, Vol. 12, pp. 265-279.
66. Feess, E., Ossig, S. and Walzl, M. (2005). The Impact of Truth-Telling and Limited Wealth in a Principal-Agent Model, *Schmalenbachs Business Review*, Vol. 57, pp. 234-246.
67. Feess, E. (2005). Bosman und die Folgen - was lernen wir aus der Empirie? *Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht*, Vol. 2, pp. 365-377.
68. Feess, E. and Walzl, M. (2004). Optimal Law Enforcement and Self-Reporting when there are Criminal Teams, *Economica*, Vol. 71, pp. 703-710.
69. Feess, E. and Walzl, M. (2004). Delegated Expertise – When are Good Projects Bad News? *Economics Letters*, Vol. 82, pp. 77-82.
70. Feess, E. (2003). Transfer Fee Regulations in European Football, *European Economic Review*, Vol. 47, pp. 645-668.

71. Feess, E. and Mühlheuser, G. (2003). The Impact of Transfer Fees on Professional Sports: An Analysis of the New Transfer System for European Football, *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, Vol. 105, pp. 139-154.
72. Feess, E. and Mühlheuser, G. (2002). Economic Consequences of Transfer Fee Regulations in European Football, *European Journal of Law and Economics*, pp. 221-237.
73. Feess, E. and Hege, U. (2003). Safety Monitoring, Capital Structure and Financial Responsibility, *International Review of Law and Economics*, Vol. 23, pp. 323-339.
74. Feess, E. and Hege, U. (2002). Safety Regulation and Monitor Liability, *Review of Economic Design*, Vol.7, pp. 173-185.
75. Feess, E. and Heesen, E. (2002). Self-Reporting with Ex-Post Asymmetric Information, *Journal of Economics*, Vol. 77(2), pp. 141-153.
76. Feess, E. and Mühlheuser, G. (2002). Strategic Environmental Policy, Clean Technologies and the Learning Curve, *Environmental and Resource Economics*, Vol. 23, pp. 149-166.
77. Feess, E. and Nell, M. (2002). Independent Safety Controls with Moral Hazard, *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, Vol. 158(3), pp. 408-419.
78. Feess, E. and Mühlheuser, G. (2002). Auswirkungen des neuen Transfersystems auf den europäischen Fussball: Eine mikroökonomische Analyse, *Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaftslehre*, Vol. 4, pp. 143-162.
79. Feess, E., Ewert, R. and Nell, M. (2000). Auditor Liability Rules under Imperfect Information and Costly Litigation, *European Accounting Review*, Vol. 9(3), pp. 371-385.
80. Feess, E., Ewert, R. and Nell, M. (2000). Prüfungsqualität, Dritthaftung und Versicherung, *Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis*, Vol. 6, pp. 158-172.
81. Feess, E. and Taistra, G. (2000). The Porter Hypothesis on Environmental Policy in an Oligopoly Model with Cost Asymmetry Caused by Innovation, *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, 220/0.
82. Feess, E. and Mühlheuser, G. (2000). Settling Multiparty Accidents under Incomplete Information, *International Review of Law and Economics*, Vol. 20, pp. 255-324.
83. Feess, E. and Hege, U. (2000). Environmental Harm and Financial Responsibility, *Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance*, Vol. 25(2), pp. 220-234.
84. Feess, E. (1999). Lender Liability for Environmental Harm - an Argument Against Negligence Rules, *European Journal of Law and Economics*, Vol. 8, pp. 231-250.
85. Feess, E. and Hege, U. (1999). The Role of Insurance in the Adjudication of Multi-Party Accidents, *International Review of Law and Economics*, Vol. 19(1), pp. 69-86.
86. Feess, E. and Mühlheuser, G. (1999). Strategic Environmental Policy and the Learning Curve- the Significance of the Environmental Industry, *Review of Economics*, Vol. 50, pp. 178-194.
87. Feess, E. and Seeliger (1999). Konsequenzen eines Ausstiegs aus der Kernenergie – Ein Kritischer Vergleich vorhandener Studien, *Zeitschrift für angewandte Umweltforschung*, Vol.12, pp. 400-407.
88. Feess, E. and Hege, U. (1998). Efficient Liability Rules for Multi-Party Accidents with Moral Hazard, *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, Vol. 154(2), pp. 421-450.
89. Feess, E. (1998). Marx on Ricardo - An Explanation of some Important Misunderstandings, *The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought*, Vol. 5(2), pp. 276-291.
90. Feess, E. and Stocker, A. (1998). Handelbare Emissionsrechte und Joint Implementation als komplementäre Instrumente gegen den Treibhauseffekt, *Zeitschrift für Umweltpolitik & Umweltrecht*, Vol. 2, pp. 145-160.

91. Feess, E. (July, 1997). Strukturelles Defizit und konjunktureller Impuls im Konzept des Sachverständigenrats - einige kritische Anmerkungen, *Wirtschaftsdienst*.
92. Feess, E. (1995). Das Umwelthaftungsgesetz bei alternativer Kausalität, *Review of Economics*, Vol. 46, pp. 184-211.
93. Feess, E., Steger, U. and Weihrauch, P. (1991). Strategien zur Reduktion der Umweltbelastungen durch Einwegverpackungen. Eine Kritik der Verpackungsverordnung vom Mai 1991, *Zeitschrift für Umweltpolitik & Umweltrecht* Vol. 4, pp. 349-378.

Books

1. Umweltökonomie und -politik, sechste komplett überarbeitete Auflage, München 2024: Vahlen.
2. Mikroökonomie. Eine spieltheoretisch- und anwendungsorientierte Darstellung, 3. Auflage, Marburg 2004: Metropolis.
3. Kompaktstudium Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Bd. 12: "Wirtschaftspolitik", München 1997: Vahlen (with F. Tibitanzl).
4. Mikroökonomie. Eine Einführung in die neoklassische und klassisch-neoricardianische Preis- und Verteilungstheorie, 3. verbesserte Auflage, Marburg 1994: Metropolis.
5. Kompaktstudium Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Bd. 1: "Mikroökonomie", 3. Auflage, München 2000: Vahlen (with F. Tibitanzl).
6. Kompaktstudium Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Bd. 2: "Makroökonomie", 3. Auflage, München 2000: Vahlen (with F. Tibitanzl).
7. Die Haftung von Kreditgebern für Umweltschäden, Marburg 1997: Metropolis.
8. Haftungsregeln für multikausale Umweltschäden. Eine ökonomische Analyse des Umwelthaftungsgesetzes, Marburg 1995: Metropolis.
9. Umwelthaftungsrecht. Bestandsaufnahme, Probleme, Perspektiven der Reform des Umwelthaftungsrechts, 2. verbesserte und aktualisierte Auflage, Wiesbaden 1992: Gabler (mit G. Prätorius and U. Steger).
10. Muss Verpackung Abfall sein? Strategien zur Reduktion der Umweltbelastungen durch Einwegverpackungen, Wiesbaden 1991: Gabler (mit U. Steger and P. Weihrauch)
11. Die Redundanz der Mehrwerttheorie, Marburg 1988: Metropolis.